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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to §78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES1
1.

Does Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of Utah

render unconstitutional a municipal council's legislative
decision to occasionally have an opening ceremony before its
legislative sessions that includes the Pledge of Allegiance to
the Flag and a "thought/reading/invocation", when that ceremony
frequently results in a prayer to a God, but where any such
presentation: (a) is voluntary; (b) without payment to the
presenter; (c) non-proselytizing; (d) non-coercive; (e) involves
discretionary attendance/participation; (f) involves all cultures
and philosophies in a non-discriminatory manner; and, (g) has
numerous identified secular legislative purposes?
2.

Is the Order enjoining the individual elected

legislators of Salt Lake City from encouraging, supporting or
allowing "prayers" at City Council meetings so vague, ambiguous,
over-broad and over-inclusive as to violate:

(a) the Council

Member's rights of free expression guaranteed by the U.S. and
Utah Constitutions; (b) their "speech and debate" immunity
x

In their Docketing Statement the Council Members also
raised as an issue the lower court's failure to strike an
affidavit of the Separationistsf proposed "expert" witness in
part because the affidavit expressed philosophical and legal
conclusions instead of facts. Recognizing that this Court will
decide this issue as a matter of law, and because of space
limitations, the Council Members will not brief the Whisner
Affidavit but will rely, instead, on their Memorandum below. R.
623-7 and 1038-41.
1

privilege as elected legislators; and, (c) Rule 65A(d), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

Is the legislative action of adopting (by resolution)

the Council's internal policy regarding opening ceremonies,
entitled to a presumption of constitutional validity, which
challengers have the burden to overcome by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt?
4.

Did the lower court err in awarding a declaratory,

injunctive and monetary judgment against two elected legislators
concerning a City Council policy that they voted against and
thereby holding them vicariously liable for the political
decision of other independently elected City officials?
5.

Did the lower court err in ruling that the individual

City Council Members are answerable, personally, and not just as
representatives of the City and its legislative branch of
government?
6.

Are the individual elected Council Members of a Utah

First Class City, which operates under the optional Council-Mayor
form of government, absolutely immune from personal liability for
their legislative decisions?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case was decided below as an interpretation of Utah
constitutional law made on cross-motions for summary judgment.
Thus, there are no material issues of fact.

The Supreme Court

review is based solely on the law, with no deference afforded to
the lower court decision.

Further, the legislative act of the

.2

City Council in establishing their internal policy is entitled to
a presumption of validity.

Mt. States Tel, v. Garfield Co., 811

P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AT ISSUE
The Preamble, Article I, Section 4 and Article III are
provided with this Brief as Attachment No. 5.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For 72 years, the Salt Lake City Council (the legislative
body of Salt Lake City) has had an internal policy that provides
an opening ceremony for its legislative sessions.
occasionally includes a prayer or invocation.

This ceremony

These

presentations are made by individuals or groups representing the
broad spectrum of diversity in philosophical and religious
points-of-view in the community.

The opening ceremony policy

dates from 1851.
The plaintiff-appellees (collectively referred to in this
brief as the "Separationists") objected to the Opening Ceremony
"prayer" in 1991 and filed an action in the Third District Court
asserting that this practice violated Article I, Section 4 of the
Utah Constitution.
Judge J. Dennis Frederick heard the cross-motions for
summary judgment, and granted summary judgment in favor of the
Separationists and denied summary judgment requested by the
defendants-appellants (except where it may be otherwise
appropriate the defendants below will be referred to as the "City
Council Members").

The trial court subsequently denied the City
3

Council Members' motion for clarification of the Memorandum
Decision and objection to the Separationistsf proposed Order.
The court below also failed to quash the affidavit of an "expert"
witness submitted by the Separationists.
The City Council Members and the City Council appeal the
ruling below that bars the Council's opening ceremony which
includes an invocation.

The City Council and four Council

Members (Whitehead, Hardman, Kirk and Hale) assert that, in
addition to an improper construction of Article I Section 4, the
lower court ruling violates their rights of free expression both
as citizens and as elected officials.

It also violates their

speech and debate immunity privileges guaranteed under the Utah
and the U.S. Constitution.

Two Council Members (Pace and

Godfrey), who had voted against continuing the invocation opening
ceremony practice, appeal only the order and monetary judgment
against them individually.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The undisputed material facts are as follows:
1.

The area now known as Utah was first permanently settled

in July 1847 by a religious people fleeing persecution.
Following Utah f s connection to the United States of America, the
legislative branches of virtually all government bodies with
jurisdiction over the area, have included invocations as part of
opening ceremonies of their legislative sessions.
A.

Territorial Legislature.

2.

The Legislature of the Territory of Deseret (Utah)
4

routinely commenced its sessions with a prayer or invocation.
The records of the first seven sessions of the Territorial
Legislature, beginning in 1850, cannot be found in the State
Archives-2

The first Journals which are preserved in the

Archives begin on Monday, December 15, 1858.

On this day, and

throughout the following session, prayers were offered before the
proceedings began.3
B.

Salt Lake City.

3.

Salt Lake City was incorporated some 45 years before

Utah became a state, following the adoption of an ordinance by
the Territorial Legislature on January 9, 1851.

Then known as

"Great Salt Lake City", the City was established under the
"federal model" with a strong executive (mayor) elected at large
and an 11 member City Council representing legislative districts.
This City Council legislative body met for the first time on
January 11, 1851.

Two days later, on January 13, 1851, it began

a longstanding practice of commencing its sessions with an
opening ceremony which included a prayer.
4.

(Exhibit "F"; R. 366.)

The City has remained in continuous existence from 1851

to the present and the State's Constitution expressly recognizes
it as the State's capital.

(Utah Constitution Article XXII,

Section 3.)
2

Record notation from the State Archives attached and
incorporated as Exhibit "C" to the City Council Members'
Memorandum below. R. 355-6. Exhibits submitted to the District
Court will be referred to in this Brief as "Exhibit '
'; R. . ,f
3

Copies of the handwritten Journal entries, Exhibit "D"; R.
357-8.
5

5.

Except for a period between 1911 and 1980 when the State

legislature mandated that Utah cities adopt a commission form of
government (which merged the executive and legislcitive
functions), Salt Lake City has operated under this federal
model.4
6.

In 1980 (pursuant to §10-3-1201, et seq., U.C.A.), the

electorate of Salt Lake City adopted the Council-Strong Mayor
form of government.

This form of government strictly separates

the executive and legislative functions.

The executive functions

are carried out solely by the Mayor, while the legislative
functions are reserved to the City Council.

§10-3-1209, U.C.A.;

Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978).
7.

The City Council consists of seven CounciL Members, each

representing geographic districts of roughly equal population.
(Exhibit "H"; R. 400-4.)

Following is 1980 creation, the Council

began holding regular evening legislative meetings to give
greater public access to its proceedings.

(Exhibit "I"; R. 405-

20. )
8.

At its first meeting on January 8, 1980, the City

Council decided to open the meeting with a ceremony which
included the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer.

From January 15,

1980 until October 15, 1987, the proceedings of the City Council
reflect that a prayer or invocation was usually offered at the
4

See Compiled Laws of Utah, 107 Section 182, as amended by
Chapter 125, Laws of Utah, 1911; Larsen v. Salt Lake City, 44
Utah 437, 141 P. 98 (1914); Section 10-3-1709 U.C.A.; Section
2.06.010, .020 and .060, Salt Lake City Code, Exhibit "H"; R.
400-4.

6

beginning of each weekly legislative meeting,

(Exhibit "I"; R.

405-20. )
9.

In a letter dated September 23, 1987, Assistant City

Attorney Ray Montgomery offered an opinion to the City Council
that, pursuant to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 77 L.Ed. 2d
1019 (1983), opening ceremonies including prayerful invocations
were constitutionally permissible.

Montgomery also attached a

"Suggestion Sheet" to be given to those offering prayers,
emphasizing that any such invocation must be non-denominational
and non-proselytizing nature.
10.

(Exhibit "J"; R. 421-3.)

Opening ceremony prayers were suspended for a few

months in the Spring of 1988 while the Council debated continuing
the practice.

On May 17, 1988, the City Council re-instituted

the practice of including prayers as part of the opening
ceremonies of some Council meetings.

(Exhibit "I", R. 405-20.)

Pursuant to the Council's purposeful policy of including all
points-of-view in the community, a wide variety of prayers,
invocations and thoughts have been offered before the City
Council meetings.

This diversity is illustrated by a list of

opening ceremony providers for Fiscal Year 1990:

Scientologists,

Baha f i, Greek Orthodox, Eckankarists, police chaplains and
ordinary citizens have all participated.

These opening thoughts

have included "Christian"-type prayers, non-"Christian" prayers,
thoughts and simple moments of silence.
11.

(Exhibit "K"; R. 424-8.)

Following a letter in 1991 from the SeparationistsT

attorney that questioned the Council's practice of allowing
7

Opening Ceremony "prayers", the Council sought to clarify and
formalize its policies.

The Council preliminarily discussed

adopting a formal clarification by written policy modifications.
(Exhibit "L"; R. 429-31.)
the filing of this suit.
12.

These discussions occurred prior to
(Exhibit "L"; R. 424-31.)

On September 26, 1991, and prior to their adoption,

these draft documents were transmitted to the Separationists'
attorney for comment by him or his clients.
received.
13.

No response was

(Exhibit "M"; R. 432-3.)
The Council adopted the Opening Ceremony Policy on

October 17, 1991, by a five-two vote.

Tom Godfrey and Nancy Pace

voted against the policy and against continuing the
"thought/reading/invocation" practice.
14.

(Exhibit "N"; R. 434-43.)

The formally adopted Council Policy provides that the

Council will hear various "thoughts, readings and invocations"
prior to beginning certain legislative sessions, as part of an
Opening Ceremony which includes the Pledge of Allegiance to the
Flag.5
15.

The Policy further specifies that these "thoughts,

readings and invocations" are offered for a number of secular
purposes.

These include:

(a) creating a moment during which the

Council Members and the audience can reflect on the business
before the Council; (b) promotion of an atmosphere of civility;
(c) encouragement of lofty thought and high-mindedness; (d)

5

Exhibit "0"; R. 444-7.
Attachment 1 to this Brief.

A copy of the Policy is provided as

8

recognition of cultural diversity; and (e) fostering sensitivity
for and recognition of the uniqueness of all segments of our
community.
16.

(Attachment 1.)

Without dictating the content of any "thought, reading

or invocation", the Council Policy expresses a preference for
non-denominational and non-proselytizing Opening Ceremony
presentation.
17.

Id.

The Council Policy also provides that traditional

patriotic documents may be read or songs such as The
Spangled

Banner,

Utah We Love

Thee

Star

and others may be performed.

The lyrics to these songs all include references to "God".
(Exhibit "P"; R. 488-52.)
18.

Presentation of the Opening Ceremony is coordinated by

the Salt Lake City Police Chaplain who makes an effort to obtain
a wide variety of representation from various religious and other
philosophical affiliations.

Additionally, The Policy provides

that, anyone not contacted by the Chaplain can make arrangements
to give their own Opening Ceremony presentation.

The presenters

are not compensated in any way, nor is there any other direct
expenditure of City monies or properties.
19.

(Attachment 1.)

Legislative and business matters before the Council are

conducted in conformity with the Utah Open and Public Meetings
Act, including the posting of an agenda that lists the matters to
be discussed and their order.

(§52-4-1, U.C.A.)

These notices

generally include a schedule with particular starting times.
(Note the references to hearing times on Exhibit "I"; R. 405-20.)
9

Thus, any member of the audience at a Council Meeting is not
required to be in the room during the Opening Cere^mony.

The

audience member could simply choose the enter the Council
Chambers at the time of the scheduled matter of interest•
20.

With the brief exception discussed in Fact No, 10 above

during which time the Council was reconsidering its policy, this
separate and co-equal legislative body of the City has opened its
meetings with a ceremony which included a prayer or invocation.
This practice of beginning Council legislative sessions with
opening ceremonies including prayer has been in existence for a
combined period of approximately 72 years, dating to 1851.
C.

Constitutional Convention.

21.

In 1894, after a long struggle and after several

attempts by Utah for admission to the Union had been rejected,6
the United States Congress passed an Enabling Act setting forth
the terms under which the United States would consider the
acceptance of Utah as a state.
Chapter 138, p. 107.7

Statutes at Large, 53rd Congress,

The first requirement found in Section 3

of the Enabling Act is that the Constitution proposed for Utah
6

Utah's three prior attempts to join the United States had
been rejected by Congress. (For a thorough and interesting
discussion of Utah's admission to the Union see Hickman, Utah
Constitutional Law, Doctoral Thesis, University of Utah, 1954,
pp. 40-79. Relevant excerpts from Hickman were attached as
Appendix "1" to the Council Members* Memorandum below; R. 23371. )
7

The full text of the Enabling Act is set out in the
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention:
1985 ("Proceedings"), pp. 3-8; R. 272-76. Copies of all relevant
pages of the Proceedings cited below were provided as Exhibit "A"
to the Council Members' Memorandum; R. 272-352.
.10

must ensure:
That perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be
secured, . . .
(Emphasis added.)
22.

On March 4, 1895, as commanded by the Enabling Act,

delegates from across Utah convened for Utah's final
Constitutional Convention.

The Convention was opened with a

prayer offered by President George Q. Cannon of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

(Proceedings, p.9; R. 278.)

Over the next 66 days the delegates had 55 public business
meetings.

On 54 of those days prayers were offered.8

At least

31 assorted ministers, reverends and elders representing at least
14 different religious congregations gave prayers.

Two military

chaplains, a lieutenant from the Salvation Army and 18 different
delegates also led the Convention in prayer.

Among the different

churches represented in prayer were Presbyterians, Lutherans,
Swedish Lutherans, Congregationalists, Mormons, Unitarians,
Baptists, African Methodist Episcopalians, Scandinavian Methodist
Episcopalians, Methodist Episcopalians and the just plain vanilla
Episcopalians.
23.

(Exhibit "B"; R. 353-4.)

The Convention made it clear that the wide variety of

religious faiths and other sentiments represented in their daily
opening prayers was representative of the diverse beliefs of the
community and the Convention's spirit of religious tolerance and
freedom:
8

There is no explanation in the Proceedings as to why there
was no prayer given on Day 60 of the Convention, May 2, 1895.
11

MR. CANNON: Mr. President, I move the name of the
church of which the reverend gentleman offering prayer
is a member be inserted after his name, and I would
like to request that this be done in each case since
the opening of the Convention. I find by reference to
our minutes of the first day, the name of the gentleman
who offered prayer and also the church with which he is
associated was given, and I think this should be done
in each case, the object of the mover of the motion
having been to show to the public that a freedom of
religious sentiment prevailed in the Convention.
Proceedings, p. 105; R. 285.
24.

(Emphasis added.)

The Conventions' discussion of what would ultimately

become Section 4 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of
Utah is exceedingly brief.

The sentence at issue in the instant

case was introduced almost exactly as it reads today.
(Proceedings, p. 230; R. 294.)
25.

Utah's Article I, Section 4 was drawn virtually

verbatim from the Constitution of the State of Washington.
214.)

(R.

Similar to Utah's history, the Washington Constitutional

Convention opened at least some of its sessions with prayer and
the Washington State Legislature has traditionally opened its
legislative sessions with prayer.

The City Council of Spokane,

Washington has prayed for at least the last 30 years.9
26.

During the Utah convention debates a number of

amendments were proposed which would have prohibited funding
secular as opposed to only "religious" institutions.

The

delegates opted for the language as originally proposed, which
9

Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention,
p. 14, Exhibit "X"; R. 791-2. Excerpts from the House Journal
and the Senate Journal of the Washington Legislature, Exhibit
"Y"; R. 793-800. Excerpts from the Official Gazette of Spokane,
Washington, Exhibit "Z"; R. 801-4.
12

they understood to prohibit funding religious "organizations."
(Proceedings, p. 231 and 244-248; R. 231 and 297-301.)

Thus, the

relevant portion of Article 1 Section 4 was adopted as initially
proposed.

(Proceedings, p. 365; R. 313.)

D.

Utah State Legislature.

27.

On January 4, 1986, President Grover Cleveland

proclaimed that the terms of the Enabling Act had been met and
that Utah was, therefore, admitted to the Union on an equal
footing with the original states.

(Statutes at Large, 54th

Congress, pp. 876-7. )
28.

The first session of the State Legislature met on

January 6, 1896.

Both the Special Session, called to fix the

date for the General Session, and the General Session itself were
opened with prayers.10
29.

At least six members of the 1895 Constitutional

Convention were members of the first State Legislature.
867.)

(R.

No objection to opening legislative sessions with prayer

was made by any member of the Legislature, including those
members who had drafted and adopted Article I, Section 4 of the
Utah Constitution.

History records no objection to opening

sessions of the legislative bodies of the State and political
subdivisions, including cities, with prayer dating from the
settlement of the Territory in 1847.

10

The 1992 Utah State

Journal of the House, pp. 16 and 29, part of Exhibit "E",
R. 359-65. The Journal of the Senate for 1896 was unavailable
from the Archives at the time of the District Court action
because it was being microfilmed in the Archives.
• 13

Legislature commenced every day of its legislative sessions with
an opening prayerful invocation.

(See 1992 House and Senate

Journals. )
E.
30.

National Practice.
Although opening ceremonial prayers are almost a

universal practice in all states of the union and most political
subdivisions of those states even from before the founding of the
Republic, there are no known state decisions holding legislative
prayers to be unconstitutional.

(Cf. Marsh v. Chambers, supra.

The Separationists' have never cited such a case.)
F.

Parties Named Below and Practical Effects of Order.

31. - The Separationists named as defendants the individual
members of the City Council in their representative capacity as
elected legislators.

(Complaint heading, introductory paragraph

and prayer for relief; R. 2 and 6-7.)

The Separationists

voluntarily dismissed one Council Member when his term expired.
(R. 785-6.)

However, the Order below granted a judgment for

costs and an injunction against the remaining Council Members
personally.

(Order; R. 1055-8. ) X 1

This judgment even applied

to Nancy Pace and Tom Godfrey who had opposed the Council prayer
policy and had voted against it.12
32.

In fear of being in contempt of the lower courts

n

A copy of the Order granting Summary Judgment is provided
as Attachment 4 with this Brief.
12

See Defendants' Motion for Clarification and Objection to
Proposed Implementing Order, R. 996-8. Copies of the Council
Members Memoranda regarding the lower courtf s Order and
Memorandum Decision are provided as Attachment 3 with this Brief.
.14

Memorandum Decision,13 the City Council interrupted a citizen
uttering a protest prayer during the March 17, 1992 Council
meeting.

(R. 1038-41.)

The City Council members are also

uncertain what constitutes a "prayer" prohibited under the lower
court's injunction and whether any recitation, a reference or
appeal to a God is prohibited.

(Attachment 3; R. 996-8, 999-1006

and 1032-7. )
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The first rule of constitutional construction, to which all
other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain the intent and
purpose of those who framed and adopted the Constitution.
General Electric Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301
P.2d 741 (1956).

In addition, constitutional provisions are to

be constructed together to produce a harmonious whole.
University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d
348 (1956).

That is, the courts have a duty to balance competing

values in a way that is consistent with the underlying principles
of a representative democracy and a "check and balance system" of
shared power.

City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513

(Utah 1990).
This Court has identified a bag of tools used to interpret
Constitution provisions including:

(a) reviewing historical

background and the framersf understanding as demonstrated by long
accepted usage; (b) studying Convention debates; (c) reading

13

R. 978-92. A copy of the Memorandum Decision is provided
as Attachment 2 with this Brief.
15

similar provisions and interpretations of other states; (c)
comparing related federal provisions; (d) evaluating case law
development; (e) reading the natural meaning of the words used;
and, (f) balancing competing constitutional values-

Matheson v.

Ferry, 641 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982).
All of these interpretive tools demonstrate that the framers
of the Constitution of Utah had no intent or purpose to preclude
legislative opening ceremonies that include a "thought/reading/
invocation", such as the Policy adopted by the Salt Lake City
Council.

Rather, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Utah's

Article I, Section 4 is not unique in its religious antiestablishment purpose.

I has adopted almost verbatim from

Constitution of the State of Washington.
A long historical tradition of action and interpretation
ineluctably compels this conclusion.
Legislature prayed.

Utah's Territorial

The Constitutional Convention prayed.

The

Salt Lake City Council began praying at the opening of its
meetings 45 years before statehood.

The State Legislature's

practice of opening prayers began with its first session and has
continued peacefully and uninterrupted for almost 100 years.
This was true even though six delegates to the Constitutional
Convention were also members of the first State Legislature.
The lower court employed an improper one dimensional "plain
meaning" analysis and ignored both history and the proper
standards of constitutional interpretation.

The trial court

failed to interpret Article I, Section 4 consistent with the
. 16

framers1 intent and purpose, which was to prohibit the
establishment of an institutional church supported by public
resources.

The lower court also failed to balance competing

constitutional values, such as the guarantee of religious
toleration, protections of the right of conscience, and the
deference accorded to a separate and equal branch of government's
right to control its proceedings.

As such, the Order prohibiting

"prayers" as a component of legislative opening ceremonies was in
error and must be reversed.
The Order below is further infirm because it fails to
narrowly define its content-based prior restraint injunction.
Under a strict scrutiny test, the Order is not limited in its
scope on a "least restrictive means" basis.

As such, the free

speech rights of the City Council Members are violated.

The

Order impermissively gags these Council Members' right to sing
patriotic songs, read patriotic documents, administer oaths and
make a host of other utterances that contain prayerful
declarations, importunings or just any simple mention of any God.
In addition, the Order grants a personal judgment against
elected Council Members for the legislative votes contrary to
absolute legislative immunity and their legislative speech and
debate privilege.

The lower court also improperly held two

Council Members vicariously liable for a legislative decision
that each politically opposed and voted against.

The Order even

exposes these dissenters to personal liability for a money
judgment in favor of the Separationists.
.17

The lower court? s Memorandum Decision and Order are in error
as a matter of law.

They set a dangerous precedent that

undermines a balanced accommodation of religious tolerance and
the prohibition against a State established religion.

It is not

appropriate to establish a standard of constitutional
construction that permits a citizen to burn the American flag in
protest, but which requires an elected legislator, upon pain of
contempt, to expel a citizen from a public legislative meeting
for uttering a prayerful protest to a Court's ruling.
The lower court's Order must be reversed.

The Council's

Policy must be declared constitutional.
POINT I
TO DETERMINE WHETHER ARTICLE I, SECTION 4
PROHIBITS OPENING LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS WITH
CEREMONIAL PRAYER THIS COURT MUST DETERMINE
THE INTENT OF THE CONSTITUTION'S FRAMERS.
A.

THE FIRST CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION IS THE DETERMINATION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT AND
PURPOSE.

The lower court's Memorandum Decision is a strict
constructionist assertion holding that simply because some public
resources (over one cent) are involved in the Council opening
ceremony, where an invocation is sometimes offered, a violation
of Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution has, ipso facto,
occurred.

(R. 978-92; Attachment 2.)

Constitutional

interpretation is made of sturdier stuff than such unsubtle
approaches.
Even the most preferred and privileged value in our American
18
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21 L.Ed. 2d 731 (1969)"; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 S
1093 (1940); Stromberq v. California, ?.S3 '' -' *-« "^5
' ' ^ '1931).

and controls include statutes prescribing or regulating:

libel

and slander; national security secrets; commercial trade secrets;
and obscenity.16

"Time, place and manner" regulations are also

constitutionally employed to regulate First Amendment protected
speech.17,

18

In short, constitutional analysis requires more than a
mechanical application of only the "plain meaning" tool for
determining "intent".

The lower court's "plain meaning" rule is

not even the proper phraseology of the test it purports to adopt.
This Court has held that only if the provisions of the
Constitution are "crystal clear" will the constitutional framers'
contemporaneous understanding and extemporaneous construction of
the provisions not be utilized.

This Court held:

But if the words are ambiguous or their meaning not
clear, or if the several provisions of the basic
instrument are susceptible to two or more possible
meanings or constructions, then it is proper to look
outside the instrument itself to ascertain what the
16

See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987);
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 86 L.Ed.. 1031 (1942);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973).
17

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073
(1978); City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 89
L.Ed.2d 29 (1986).
18

Utahfs Constitutional Analogue to the First Amendment,
Article I, Section 15, despite its almost "crystal clarity" (no
law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech
or of the press") has also been held to tolerate a number of
"yes", "no", "maybe" or "sometimes" exceptions. See, e.g., West
Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners, 586 P.2d
429 (Utah 1978); Ogden City v. Eagle Books, Inc., 586 P.2d 436
(Utah 1978); KUTV, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 686 P.2d 456 (Utah 1984);
and State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (Utah 1975).
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comparing related U.S. Constitutional concepts; considering the
"crystal clear" language of the provision utilized; and, applying
long historic application and construction.

Matheson. supra;

University of Utah, supra.
Specifically, this Court has held that long and peaceful
acquiescence in a particular meaning, demonstrated by historic
practice dating from territorial days, will be given great weight
in interpreting the intent and purpose of a particular provision.
Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 382 (1970).
This principle was clearly articulated when this Court was called
upon to determine the constitutionality of legislation which
stripped the state treasurer of certain functions.

In construing

the language in the constitution defining the duties of the State
Treasurer, the Court looked to the understanding of territorial
times and observed:
Those duties are not specified in the Constitution
because there was, at the time the Constitution was
drafted and adopted, the office of territorial
treasurer whose duties were so well known to the
framers of the Constitution that they may have
considered it unnecessary to detail them.
Allen v. Rampton, 23 Utah 336, 463 P.2d 7, 8 (1969); see also,
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company, 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977).
Thus, the various devices used to ascertain intent and
fulfill the purpose of the Constitution requires a multifaceted
analysis.

Further, there must be a balancing of other

constitutional and societal values that are conflictingly
reflected in the Constitution.

In the instant case, these other

values include the right of personal conscience (Article I,
22
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Attachment: L

First, the actual standard for construing a constitu-..
provision based solely on the language of the document is a
requirement that the language be "crystal clear ' before
extraneous evidence is admissible. University of Utah, . -<u
at 361. (See p. 20, above.)

Governor to determine which branch of government, under the
Constitution and a particular statute, had the power to name
members to the State Board of Higher Education.

In answering the

interpretative question, this Court looked at past practices in
Utah and other states concerning residual appointment powers.

In

the only quote even close to the proposition claimed by the lower
court, the Utah Supreme Court held:
The defendants point to a number of Utah statutes which
create offices and provide for appointments other than
by the Governor. The practical consideration placed on
constitutional provisions, when long acquiesced in, is
of aid to the courts in determining the meaning of the
language of a constitutional provision, but it cannot
be controlling so as to amend the Constitution by a
means of a series of mutual mistakes, and especially is
this true where the language is otherwise clear.
Id. at 382.

(Emphasis added.)

Rampton, therefore, does not elevate the "plain meaning"
rule as supreme above all other forms of constitutional
interpretation.

Rampton simply says that a traditional usage and

understanding may be a guide to interpreting constitutional
intent.

This proposition is exactly what the City Council and

its members have consistently argued, but which the lower court
failed here even to consider.
2.

THE "PLAIN MEANING" RULE IS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE

ARE AMBIGUITIES, CONFLICTING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
HISTORICAL USAGE THAT MUST BE EVALUATED.
Even the crystal clarity rule, assuming it were the end of
constitutional analysis rather than simply one of the tools,
would be unavailing here.

Absolutely nothing in Article I,
.24
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Article I, Section 5 of the Const-.'. uti.. a jf Oregon
contains a clause specifically prohibiting "any money he Ting]
appropriated for the payment of any religeous [sic] service in
either house of the Legislative Assembly." (Emphasis added.)
The Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1889 and was one :f the
documents considered by the Utah Constitutional Convention. .See
Hickman, Appendix 1 (R. 265).) This omission of Oregon's very
explicit prohibition on legislative religious activity is furtner
evidence of the weakness of the argument that "almost every
imaginable protection for religious freedom and injunction
against the union of church ar.c state has beer: included
"
ACLU Memorandum; R. 578. With all due respect to Professor Mazor
who wrote the article cited by the ACLU for this proposition, the
Professor had apparently failed to read :ne Oregon Constitution.
See, Note, Notes on a Bill of Rights ,. U13n :,. Rev. 326 , 331
(1966).
,,,25

Constitutional Convention did not intend to prohibit the payment
of public monies for legislative prayers.
Like the analysis necessary to apply the First Amendment to
a specific factual situation, there are many ambiguities in the
history and wording of Article I, Section 4 that need in-depth
analysis.

For example:
(a)

What is the meaning of the phrase "religious

worship, instruction or exercise" in the context of a City
legislative opening ceremony that has secular objectives?
These words are no more "crystal clear" than the words
"press" or "speech" in the First Amendment or Article I,
Section 15.

The trial court apparently chose to define the

phrase "religious worship, instruction or exercise" as being
synonymous with "prayer", but without consideration of its
secular context in a legislative forum.23
(b)

If Article I, Section 4 is so plain in its meaning

prohibiting legislative prayer, why has it taken
approximately 145 years from the founding of Utah as a
territory and the almost 100 years since statehood for such
a "plain meaning" to be now miraculously revealed by the
Separationists in this lawsuit?
(c)

Why did the lower court make no attempt to

reconcile its newly discovered "plain meaning" of Article I,
23

The Memorandum Decision appears to adopt by reference the
Society of Separationists' reliance on the Webster's Dictionary
definition of "prayer" as being, ipso facto, religious worship or
exercise. Attachment "B"; R.978-92. There is no case law or
history that supports this construction.
26
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THE INTENT OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 4 AS
DETERMINED BY APPLYING THE APPROPRIATE TOOLS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION PROVES THAT
THE CITY COUNCIL'S OPENING CEREMONY POLICY
INCLUDING PRAYERS IS CONSTITUTIONAL
Having recognized that 'hi- "plai n mean.:.no

:r more

.*- .: ^y

correctly, the "crystal clarity" rule is merely one tool to
determine the intent of a constitutional provision, this Court
should then apply all the other tools for determining the intent
and purpose of Article I, Section 4.

Application of these tools

demonstrate that the Separationists have failed to meet their
burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the City Council
practice beyond a reasonable doubt.
The tests derived from Matheson and other cases by this
Court for interpreting constitutional provisions conclusively
demonstrate the true intent and purpose.

These points are

analyzed below:
(A)

Understanding and Expectations of Framers Measured by

Historic Usage and Practice.
The practice of opening ceremonies for legislative sessions,
which include prayerful invocations for legislative sessions,
predates settlement of the Utah Territories and dates to the
founding of the American Republic.

It was more than common.

It

was and is almost universally practiced in all State of the Union
from the 1700fs to date.

Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.

The Utah settlers were a religious people that followed this
national tradition by commencing their legislative sessions with
prayer, at least by 1851.

Salt Lake City was incorporated in

1851 and for some 72 years (essentially the entire period during
which it had an independent legislative branch of government) has
had an opening ceremony that included invocations containing
re

f e r e n c e s to a deity.

The Territorial Legislature prayed.
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The Utah Constitution is not an unusual document. It
is borrowed directly from orher state constitutions and
the appeal to the authority of other states w a s a
persuasive argument; £:.r t-h^ inc* is: :; of a given
provision.

The constant appeal to the authority of other states is
one of the most striking impressions one gains from
reading the debates. Frequently reference was made to
the constitutions of the northwest states which had
been written in 1889. The Washington Constitution in
particular was used by the members of the Convention:
Often Sections and Articles would be taken verbatim
from this source.
Hickman, supra at 72, R. 265.

(Footnote omitted.)

The debates are devoid of any discussion or concern over
prayers at public gatherings or as a part of legislative
sessions.

In fact, there is nothing to suggest a concern or a

view that the Utah Constitution should act as a bar to government
recognition of a Supreme Being in governmental operations, which
was a predominate belief of the people then as it is today.
To the contrary, the Convention's practice of opening its
sessions with prayer requires the conclusion that they approved
and accepted the activity, in a governmental cont€>xt, as entirely
appropriate.

In fact, they even took pains to extol a procedure

of including a broad diversity of religious beliefs in their *
opening prayers as an example of religious toleration.
No. 22 and 23.

(See Fact

Cf. Article III of the Utah Constitution,

requiring "perfect toleration" of religious belief.)
The Salt Lake City Council's invocation practice is even
more inclusive than the process used by the constitutional
framers of Utah's Constitution.

The Council's policy is

consistent with and would have been held to be constitutionally
appropriate by the framers, as revealed by the Convention
debates.
(C)

Similar State Constitutional Provisions and
30

;

Interpretations.

» •

• : "

'

constitutional langucjge .vhiju si,eci t :.ca; , / oa: s
religious ar-^-'vi^y
cons:: * ur. ic

*;

•

..•*^;.-.

: •

:

Instead

legioiature

Utah adopted a

.

* -•' '

legislative and municipal prayer from tit- 11 in* *
cons 1:i !:: 1 11:i oi

r i.ts

convention and continuing iorward to t o d a > .

(Fact

No. 2 5 )
There is no dispute that the practice of opening
sess i ens of state governnierits
country; ha~
America.

existed

legislative

ci ties and towns (th *~^\or,c . - -he
ic. 1 on«; aR +-he

-it ie-o*

T'^^ Seoara~ i on.: sts have

,.;-:o;; ^t^*-

c:*ed a .y case holding tra'*

provision.
(

Federal Analogue - ^arsh v. Chambers.

l:.<.s Separati oni t ^ n .j~ : •• -i
tradition cf
£ r •/--•
First

inc.: udi:v; ncn-denominattcna

—-

•

•. siative cr^

\mend::ie:it

*.,*

t-r-

...

> * i *

•:...

;

n»; -rroselyn r : ng

cere^on** violates the

;^:^ed State.-. C^i. -, ti * u* JL .

S e p a r a t i o n ! s^s c m : - t e d r.his c i j i m
h i . .

. P

t

,

: t:

an o b v i :us r e a s o n

*

i

• - ,i

PI

of traditional, prayers :n Marsh v. Chambers, 463
L . :rd . ?d 101 -

19R :

no

^v analogy. Marsh supcorts

:

;

or

. . •
f

:\ - Ci*"^

In Marsh, the Supreme Court considered whether the Nebraska
legislature s cric^Lr- of opening eacr
prayer,

by a

.:u^

::.: t n ; :;

•

- ;.. .

' ^gisl^tive day with a
*.

.
- ,.-MJ

• .«e

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

In its analysis,

the Supreme Court traced, as the City has done in this Brief, the
history of prayers opening legislative sessions.

The Court found

that "the Continental Congress, beginning in 1774, adopted the
traditional procedure of opening its sessions with a prayer
offered by a paid chaplain."

Id. at 787.

(Citations omitted.)

Unlike the Utah Constitutional Convention, the United States
Constitutional Convention did not open its days with prayer.
However, the first United States Congress, "as one of its early
items of business, adopted the policy of selecting a chaplain to
open each session with prayer."

Id. at 787-8.

The Court then

noted that the United States Congress had consistently thereafter
paid chaplains and opened legislative sessions with prayer.
The Court also found that almost every state opened their
legislative sessions with prayer.

Sometimes this practice began,

as in Utah, even before the state was admitted into the Union.
Id. at 789, fn. 11.

Moreover, the Court, in an argument directly

applicable to the question here, noted that the First Congresses'
decision to pray and to pay a chaplain occurred in the same week
that the exact same members voted to approve the draft of the
First Amendment for submission to the states.

Accordingly, as

the Court noted, it could hardly be thought that the Congress
"intended the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to forbid
what they had just declared acceptable."

Id. at 790.

The Court

concluded:
This unique history leads us to accept the
interpretation of the First Amendment draftsmen who saw
32

real threat to the Establishment Clause arising i i • MII
* i
_ ract . - of prayer similar to that now challenged.
Id. at

-1 .
.-> .r.;. ' <>r i ts decision, the Supreme C )urt emphasized

that the First uungn=;oo di I n I
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[A]s a proselytizing activity of as symbolic pidcii\;
the governments "official seal of approval" on one
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Id. at: '92.
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Light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of
more than two hundred (200) years, there can be no
doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions
with prayer has become part of the fabric of our
society. To invoke Divine guidance on a public body
entrusted with making the laws is not, in these
circumstances, an "establishment" of religion or a step
toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people
of this country. As Justice Douglas observed, " [w]e
are a religious people whose institutions presuppos-- Supreme Being."
Id. at 792.

(Citations omitted,, empr.:j:

: . :•
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a clergyman of only one denomination - Presbyterian - had been
selected as chaplain for sixteen years.

In rejecting this fact

as requiring invalidation of the tradition, the Supreme Court
noted that the appointed chaplain was not the only clergyman
heard by the legislature; guest chaplains officiated on certain
occasions and other substitutes also gave prayers.

Further,

without "proof that the chaplain's reappointment stemmed from an
impermissible motive, we conclude that his long tenure does not
in itself conflict with the Establishment Clause."

Id. at 793-4.

(Footnote omitted.)
The second attack on the Nebraska tradition involved the
payment of the chaplain from public funds.

Again, the Supreme

Court noted that such payment was acceptable as part of a long
tradition adopted by many state legislatures and the United
States Congress.
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether
Nebraska's long tradition of the prayers being primarily JudeoChristian in nature somehow violated the First Amendment.

The

Court noted that because there was no indication that the prayers
were used to proselytize or advance any particular religion, or
to disparage any other religion, there was no need for the Court
to "embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse the content of a
particular prayer."

Id. at 795.

None of these three potential infirmities are present in the
instant case.

No payment is made to any individual presenting

prayer during the Opening Ceremony.
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It is clear that neither the 1/ draftsmen of the
Constitution who were Members of the First Congress,
nor the Congress of 1739, saw any establishment problem
in the employment of Congressional Chaplains to offer
daily prayers in the Congress, a practice that has
continued for nearly two centuries. It would be
difficult to identify a more striking example of the
accommodation of religious belief intended by the
Framers.
Lynch v. Donnelly, *.
(Emphasis addea.' ;
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Utah Supreme Court and Federal Interpretations of

Article I. Section 4.
T h e U t a 1 I S i i p i: e m e C • : • i 11: t 1 I a = 1: \ i., i c e c o i: i s i d e r e d A r t: i c J e I, '

The Cci+z z recently reaffirmed this rUl L:\K; jnd
distinguished legislative prayers from school graduation prayers.
See Lee v. Weisman, _ rJ. S
'" TT "* r
Vs">
\ "':- ! Mr. 901014, June 24, 1992) .
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Section 4 in ways which are analogous to the instant case.25
Both of these cases militate in favor of the constitutionality of
the Salt Lake City Council tradition.
In Gubler v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 113 Utah
188, 192 P.2d 580 (1948), the Utah Supreme Court held that a
State law which permitted public school teachers to receive
retirement credit in the State Retirement System for years which
they had spent teaching in parochial schools was not prohibited
by Article I, Section 4.

The Court held:

Under the present plan, no money is being appropriated
or used to maintain any school operated or controlled
by a church and no funds are used to assist in
maintaining any essential element of such a school.
Likewise, no public money or property has been
appropriated or is being applied to any religious
worship, exercise, or instruction. We fail to see how
the amendment in any way breaches the wall between
church and state.
Id. at 587 (Emphasis added.)

The Gubler Court construed Article

I, Section 4 consistent with its framers' intent; it was viewed
as an anti-establishment provision prohibiting the creation of an
institutional church.
In Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197
P.2d 477 (1948), this Court considered a challenge to the use of
State funds for the construction of the Daughters of Utah Pioneer
Museum, alleging that the project would perpetuate* and benefit
the Mormon faith.

The Court held that while there undeniably

25

0ne other case in Utah has touched on the relevant portion
of Article I, Section 4. In Manning v. Sevier County, 30 Utah 2d
305, 517 P.2d 549 (1973), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the use
of public funds to construct a hospital which was to be leased
and operated by a church-held services corporation.
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were certain Mormon aspects to the pioneer settlement of Utah,
any religious effect of the Museum was merely incidental to the
legitimate secular purpose of recognizing the heroic efforts of
the pioneers and their struggle for religious freedom.

The Court

held:
Educating one to the belief of religious freedom is not
the "exercise of", "instruction in" or "worship" in any
religious faith. The school history we teach our
children builds up in their minds the importance of
religious freedom.
Id. at 489.
In Thomas, this Court recognized that Utah was a society
predominantly of one faith and that that faith was "imbued with
the idea of proselytizing."

Id. at 489. Accordingly, the Court

acknowledged a need to look closely at the actual intent and
effect of any incidental support of the Mormon faith, which might
be caused by the Museum.

In doing so, this Court decided to

adopt "that old adage 'Actions speak louder than words.f"

Id.

The Court determined that it should "require proof of overt
acts of proselytizing" before it found that the Museum was an
unconstitutional public support for one particular religion.

Id.

Upon making this investigation, the Supreme Court determined that
the Museum's legitimate secular purpose of instruction in the
belief in religious freedom was sufficient to insulate the public
support of the Museum from constitutional challenge under Article
I, Section 4.
Again, Article I, Section 4 was consistently interpreted as
an anti-establishment provision, standing against an
37

institutional church organization being subsidized in its mission
with public assets.

Thus, Thomas supports the City Council's

argument that Article I, Section 4 was not intended to prohibit
the practice of legislative prayer for defined secular purposes.
Federal case law from Utah is also consistent with this
Court's anti-establishment construction of Article I, Section 4.
In Anderson v. Salt Lake City, 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered
whether or not a granite monolith inscribed with the Ten
Commandments placed outside the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in
Salt Lake City violated either the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I,
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution.

The Tenth Circuit did not

distinguish between the prohibitions imposed by the two differing
Constitutions.

Instead, it analyzed both constitutional

challenges based on case law from the United States Supreme Court
construing the First Amendment.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that the United States Supreme
Court has long held that the First Amendment does not call for an
impossible total separation between church and state.
32. 26

Id.

at

Instead Anderson chose to look at whether the primary

effect of challenged activity was the advancement or inhibition
of religion.

Id.27

26

Citing, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L.Ed.2d 745
(1971) reh'g den'd, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
27

Citing, Abinqton School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203,
222, 10 L.Ed.2d 844, 858, (1963).
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The Tenth Circuit recognized that the level of permissive
relationship between church and state involved a balancing test
"between that which is primarily religious and that which is
primarily secular, albeit embodying some religious impact."
Anderson, 475 F.2d at 32.
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Ten
Commandments on the monolith were "at once religious and secular"
and that this dual function was part of "the role of religion in
our traditions."

Jd. at 33. Finally, with language almost

directly precedented here, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
"[t]he wholesome neutrality guaranteed by the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses does not dictate obliteration of all our
religious traditions."
(F)

Id.

Purpose and Design of Other Constitutional Provisions,

The Preamble to the Utah Constitution has a prayerful
intonation stating:
liberty, . . . "

Also, Article III guarantees religious

toleration stating:
is guaranteed."

"Grateful to Almighty God for life and

"Perfect toleration of religious sentiment

(Emphasis added.)

The first sentence of Article

I, Section 4 mandates that the rights of conscience "shall never
be infringed."
The lower court's injunction against prayer is totally
incongruous with the Constitution's Preamble and Article Ill's
guarantee of religious toleration.

As such, the Decision and

Order are at odds with the requirement that the Constitution be
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construed as a harmonious whole document,28
Unlike the lower court's terribly limiting Memorandum
Decision and Order, the Council's Policy, both in writing and in
practice, are ecumenical.

The Council not only tolerates, but

actually invites, the participation of all religious and
philosophical points of view.

The Separationists and the lower

court apparently will tolerate only one religious sentiment absolute silence.
When the proper tools of constitutional interpretation are
employed in searching out the intent and purpose of the
Constitution's framers (not just blind reliance on some newly
discovered "plain meaning"), it becomes clear that Article I,
Section 4 was not and could not have been intended to prohibit
opening ceremonies for legislative bodies that included
"readings/thoughts or invocations" such as that permitted by the
Salt Lake City Council.
POINT III
THE SEPARATIONISTS FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE
CITY COUNCIL'S PRESUMPTIVELY VALID
LEGISLATIVE ACT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
One of the basic tenets of American democracy is the
principle of a limited government, whose powers are held in check
through the doctrine of separation of powers.

See, Marbury v.

Madison, 1 Cranch 175, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

A key to

the continued maintenance of this doctrine is that one co-equal

Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829 (1964).
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branch of government will not lightly set aside or disregard the
actions of another co-equal branch of government*
To avoid such improper dominance of one branch of
government, the courts must exercise great discretion and caution
to preserve the separation of powers system, upon which our
system of democracy depends.

Allen v. Rampton, 23 Utah 2d 336,

463 P.2d 7 (1969).
In this regard, this Court has poignantly observed:
["The Utah Supreme Court] makes every reasonable
presumption in favor of constitutionality and will not
nullify a legislative enactment unless it is clear and
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. In seeking
the correct application of statutes and constitutional
provisions, the Court looks to the circumstances which
brought them into being and the purposes sought to be
accomplished.
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Utah Insurance Guaranty
Association., 564 P.2d 751, 753-4 (Utah 1977).

(Emphasis added.)

Municipal legislative acts, like State statutes, are
presumptively valid and Utah Courts should employ every
reasonable construction to render such an act valid and
constitutional.

Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037

(Utah 1975), cert, den'd, 425 U.S. 915 (1976).

This rationale is

equally applicable to municipal legislative actions memorialized
through the adoption of a legislative "resolution" such as the
Councilfs Opening Ceremony Policy.29
9

This observation is compelled by the fact that a
"resolution" is, like an "ordinance", a statement legislative
will or policy. The statutes specifically provide that
"resolutions" shall be in the same form as "ordinances" and that
votes for each shall be by roll call. See Sections 10-3-506, 717
and 718, U.C.A. Further, even though legislative power is
41

In the case at bar, the duly elected representatives of Salt
Lake City have memorialized their Policy regarding legislative
sessions, through the adoption of a formal Resolution.

This

expression of the City legislatures will for managing its own
internal affairs and establishing a mood of respect and solemnity
for its business is cloaked in the presumption of validity.
Absent a compelling and clearly articulated violation of
constitutional law, which the Separationists have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should uphold the
Council practice.

This burden and review standard is necessary

to preserve the separation of powers principle and afford
appropriate deference to legislators, elected by the people (the
ultimate sovereigns) of this State.

Since the Separationists

have failed to present any evidence rebutting this presumption of
constitutionality30 and have erroneously relied solely on the
"plain meaning" rule, the lower court's decision must be

usually exercised by ordinances (especially where criminal
sanctions, fines or forfeitures are to be employed), the law
permits the legislative body to exercise certain legislative
powers by adoption of a "resolution". Section 10-3-717, U.C.A.
In fact, the ultimate power of any legislature, its budgeting
power, can be exercised in Utah cities by either ordinance or
resolution. Section 10-6-118, U.C.A. Under Salt Lake Cityfs
optional Council-Strong Mayor form of governance, the City
Council is limited to performing legislative powers. Martindale
v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Utah 1978).
30

The Separationists' only evidence was the Whisner
Affidavit which was facially defective as being nothing more than
philosophical conjecturing. R. 623-7.
42

reversed.
POINT IV
THE ORDER ENJOINING "PRAYER" BEING ALLOWED OR
CONDUCTED BY INDIVIDUAL COUNCIL MEMBERS
VIOLATES THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF FREE
SPEECH AND VIOLATES RULE 65A(d) OF THE UTAH
R.CIV.P.
The lower court Order enjoins individual Council Members,
It provides that:
• . . defendants, their agents and employees are
permanently prohibited and enjoined from allowing or
having prayers recited at meetings of the Salt Lake
City Council and they are permanently enjoined and
prohibited from expending public funds, resources or
property to encourage such prayers . . •
(Order; R. 1056-7.

Attachment 4.)

The City Council Members objected to the Order and requested
the lower court to define the word "prayer",
Objection, R. 996-1006, 1032-7.

(Council Members'

Attachment 3.)

This Motion was

denied and the lower court refused to narrow the dictionary
definition of "prayer," which it had apparently adopted by
reference.

(Memorandum Decision, p. 14; R.992.

Attachment 2.

Cf. the definition of "prayer" in the Separationists' Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 15; R. 515.)
The definition of "prayer" contemplated by the lower court's
Order includes any address to a God or petition for divine
intervention.

As such, the individual Council Members may

presumably be enjoined from:
31

The lower court's "plain meaning" decision, without any
historical or legal support from the Separationists, amounts to
the amendment of the Constitution by a one judge referendum in
violation of Article XXIII.
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1.

Administering oaths compelling people to tell the truth

"so help them God" in legislative investigations, as authorized
by Utah law;32
2.

Uttering a personal oath or making an appeal to God

(profane or otherwise) at a Council meeting or on public
property;
3.

Permitting citizens to exercise their free rights to

speak (pray), even in protest during Council meeting (see Fact
No. 32);
A.

Personally participating, authorizing or encouraging

others to join in prayer days at Council meetings, such as:
responding to an appeal by the President of the United States for
a national day of prayer for peace in Los Angeles or the Middle
East; participating in a candlelight and prayer vigil with Mrs.
Martin Luther King concerning Civil Rights adherence; or allowing
prayers related to the State administering the death penalty.
This naked prior restraint over the content of speech and
conscience violates the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931).

Under the

required "most exacting scrutiny" test, the Order is not narrowly
tailored to limit its application to a compelling government
interest and does not use the "least restrictive means" to
accomplish that purpose.

Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 99

32

10-3-1213, 78-24-17, 18, U.C.A.; Rule 30(c) U.R.C.P. and
Rule 603 Utah Rules of Evidence.
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L.Ed.2d 333, 345 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
177, 75 L.Ed.2d 736, 744 (1983); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989).
In addition, the Order is facially overbroad and leaves the
Council Members left to guess as to its application.

Without

clarification, the Council Members are unable to determine if any
of the following activities identified in their Opening Ceremony
Policy violates the lower court's Order:

(1) pledging allegiance

to a flag of ". . . one nation under God;" (2) saying or reciting
the National Anthem, a hymn, with its prayerful admonition to
"praise the Power that hath made and preserved us a nation"; or
(3) singing or reciting many patriotic songs and historic
documents, including the State Constitutional Preamble, the
Declaration of Independence and the Utah State Song.33
Each of these historic expressions could be categorized as
"prayer" under the Webster' s Dictionary definition which the
lower court apparently adopted.

Further, the Order is ambiguous

about whether such activities as allowing the performance of

Handel's Hallelujah

Chorus,

Beethoven's Ninth

Symphony,

Christmas

carols or hymns performed in the City and County Building would
be a "prayer" in violation of the Court's Order.
Rule 65A, U.R.C.P., the maxims of equity, fundamental
fairness and elementary due process require that orders which may
subject persons to contempt must be sufficiently clear to allow
the enjoined to know what conduct is proscribed and prohibited.
33

For exact quotes see Exhibit "P"; R. 448-52.
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By not defining prohibited "prayer", the lower court's Memorandum
Decision and Order fail these tests.

Further, the lack of a

definition of prohibited "prayer" makes the appellate review by
this Court extremely difficult.
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT ORDER VIOLATES THE CITY
LEGISLATORS' SPEECH AND DEBATE PRIVILEGE AND
THEIR ABSOLUTE LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY.
The doctrine of the separation of powers and the legislative
immunity known as the "speech or debate" privilege grants
legislators absolute immunity.

United States Constitution,

Article I, §6; Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 8; Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951).

The United

States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that one of the very
limited areas in which it recognizes absolute immunity is for
"legislators carrying out rheir legislative functions
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.

,

..."

, 116 L.Ed.2d 301, 312 (1991).

In Tenney, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether or not the Civil Rights Act allowed allegedly injured
citizens to sue individual legislators for their legislative
actions.34

The Court exhaustively analyzed the common-law

history of the legislative "speech or debate" privilege.

Tracing

the privilege back to the British Parliament and the struggle of
Sir Thomas More in 1523, the Court recognized that such
legislative immunity was one of the bedrock foundations of the

34

At the time Tenney was considered, the Civil Rights
statutes were found at 8 U.S.C. §§43 and 47(3).
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American system of democracy.

The Court quoted James Wilson, a

signatory of the Constitution who was an influential member of
the Committee of Detail which placed the Speech or Debate Clause
in the Federal Constitution:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of
the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he
should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he
should be protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty
may occasion offense.
Id. at 373.
Based on the fundamental nature of the "speech or debate"
privilege and its long history, the United States Supreme Court
determined that the privilege existed as a matter of common-law.
Further, the privilege protects all legislative acts whether
worthy or unworthy, wise or unwise, popular or unpopular.
376-8.

Id.

at

The motives, opinions and any other reason for an

individual legislator's legislative activities and, thus, the
votes themselves, are simply beyond question in the courts.

The

Court summarized:
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty

. . . .

* * *

The courts should not go beyond the narrow confines of
determining that a flegislative body's actions! may
fairly be deemed within its province.
Id. at 377-8.

(Footnotes omitted, citations omitted, emphasis

added.)
The Supreme Court has followed this appropriately broad
recognition of legislative "speech or debate" privilege in a
47

number of cases.

The Court has gone so far as to say that

legislators not only are protected from "the consequences of
litigation's results but also from the burdens of defending
themselves."

Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 18 L.Ed.2d 577

(1967); see, also, Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union,
446 U.S. 719, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980) and United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966).
There is no logical reason for excluding elected municipal
legislators such as the Council Members from protection under the
speech or debate privilege.

At most, even assuming the lower

court's decision on the constitutionality of the Council policy
was correct, any order should have been limited to a declaratory
ruling on the constitutionality of the Council Policy.
The Council Members timely objected to overbreadth and
individualized effect of the proposed order.

The lower court

denied this motion and granted an injunction and judgment
directed personally at individual legislators.35
The Order even held Tom Godfrey and Nancy Pace liable for
costs and enjoined them from following a Policy that they
politically opposed and voted against.

In effect these two

elected officials were held vicariously liable for the
independent votes of other legislators.

They were thus forced to

appeal to prevent executions on their personal assets during the
pendency of the other Council Members' appeal.
The lower court's Order facially violates the legislative
35

R. 996-1006, 1032-7 and 1055-8.
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Attachments 3 and 4.

immunities and associated speech and debate privileges of the
Council Members.

As such, it must be reversed.
CONCLUSION

The intent and purpose of Article I, Section 4 of the Utah
Constitution was to prevent the establishment of an institutional
church, funded or maintained by public assets.

It was not

intended to exclude legislative opening ceremonies that recognize
a Supreme Being or preclude invocations addressed to a God.

The

lower court erred in its ruling to the contrary.
The lower court's Order is, further, overly broad and
content based prior restraint.

Thus, it infringes on the

constitutional rights of speech, legislative immunity and the
speech and debate privileges of the City's elected legislators.
In addition, the Order holds some individual legislators
vicariously liable for actions they politically opposed and voted
against, contrary to their rights and immunities.
The City Council's Policy regarding its Opening Ceremonies
was carefully crafted to advance many secular objectives
including recognition of cultural diversity and adding solemnity
to its proceedings, without "establishing" a City religion.

The

Separationists failed to meet their burden to overcome the
Policy's presumptive constitutionality.
It would be a sad day for Utah jurisprudence if someone was
constitutionally protected in burning the flag as a protest
statement, while elected legislative representatives of the
people enjoined by court from uttering prayerful declarations.
. 49

The Memorandum Decision and Order below are manifestly in error
and patently defective.

They must be reversed.

This Court

should hold that the City Council may constitutionally open its
legislative meetings with prayers.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of August, 1992.

BRUefi R. BAIRD
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Appellants
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POLICY:

OPENING CEREMONIES OF PUBLIC MEETINGS
CONDUCTED EY COUNCIL

The Presentation of Thoughts, Readinas and Invocations at
Salt Lake City Council Meetings.
A.

Purpose and Policy.
The Salt Lake City Council has traditionally invited
the presentation of thoughts, readings and invocations,
along with the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag, as an
Opening Ceremony before certain of its meetings. This
opening to the City's legislative process is solely for
a secular purpose, among other reasons, to: (1) provide
a moment during which Council Members and the audience
can reflect on the importance of the business before
the Council; (2) promote an atmosphere of civility; (3)
encourage lofty thought and high-mindedness; (4)
recognize cultural diversity; (5) foster sensitivity
for and recognize the uniqueness of all segments of our
community. The presentations shall be done on a
volunteer basis and without cost to the City. The
presentations are intended to be non-denominational and
non-proselytizing in character; however, the City will
not dictate the form or content of any such
presentation.
It is the formal policy of the Salt Lake City Council
to seek out a wide variety of community organizations,
churches and individuals to offer thoughts, readings
and invocations at Council meetings to achieve its
stated purposes.
Procedure.
1.

Thoughts, readings and invocations, together with
a Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag, will be given
at the beginning of regular Tuesday Council
meetings.

2.

Police Chaplain Max Yospe or a successor
designated by the Council will coordinate the
presentation of thoughts, readings and
invocations, as he has done in the past. When the
scheduled individual does not attend the meeting,
the Council will not make any last minute
substitutions and the meeting will begin without
any such presentation, except for the Pledge to
the Flag.
1

3.

C.

Council staff will mail a letter every six months
to a very wide variety of churches and other civic
organizations, inviting them to contact Mr. Yospe
to be scheduled for presenting a thought, reading
or invocation. Enclosed in the mailing will be a
copy of the thought/reading/invocation suggestion
sheet. Individuals who have not received a
written invitation from the Council, but who want
to participate are also welcome to present a
thought, reading or invocation at a Council
meeting by requesting, in writing, an opportunity
through Chaplain Yospe or Council staff.

4.

Every six months, Council staff will ask the City
Recorder to give the City Attorney, Police
Chaplain and City Council a listing of the
individuals giving thoughts, readings and
invocations and their religious or other relevant
affiliation, if available.

5.

The attached "Suggestions for Presenters" will be
given to each person who is designated to give a
thought, reading or invocation as a
memorialization of the Council's objectives and
desires regarding this issue.

6.

In order to better inform those attending Council
meetings that thoughts and readings, as well as
invocations, are welcome at Council meetings, the
title on the section of the Council agenda will
read •'Invocation/Reading/Thought."

Meetings Excluded.
The Opening Ceremonies above described will not be
utilized for the Council's District Town Meetings,
Committee-as-a-Whole Meetings, or special or emergency
meetings, unless directed by the Chair and approved by
a majority of the Council.

II.

Other Public Gatherings Conducted bv the Council.
A.

Purpose and Policy.
Consistent with Section IA, above, it may be
appropriate to have Opening Ceremonies for other public
meetings and gatherings, conducted under the auspices
of the Council.

B.

Content and Procedure.
The Chair designated to conduct such a public meeting
may establish an appropriate Opening Ceremony,
consistent with the theme and purpose of that occasion.

The ceremony may include: (1) Thoughts, reading or
invocations, not inconsistent with the policies and
procedures of Section IA above; (2) patriotic song(s),
including but not limited to: the National Anthem,
"America the Beautiful", "My Country 'Tis of Thee", the
State Song, or other similar songs of patriotism
generally recognized in the community; (3) the Pledge
of Allegiance to the Flag; (4) recitations from the
cannon of American or Utah historical documents, such
as but not limited to: the Declaration of Independence,
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address or Washington's Farewell
to the Nation Speech; or (5) any combination thereof.
Council Modification.
Any ceremony selected by the Chairperson may be modified,
canceled or amended by a majority vote of the Council.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR THOSE WHO PRESENT
TH0UGHTS/READINGS7INV0CATI0NS IN
SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL MEETINGS
Thank you for taking the time to volunteer to continue our
tradition of presenting a thought/reading/invocation at a City
Council meeting. We have found from long experience that a
thought/reading/invocation as a part of the opening ceremony at
the beginning of Council meetings creates a thoughtful atmosphere
in which to perform our services to the community. This practice
promotes civility, sensitivity and cultural diversity.
We recognize that we live in a community where? there are
many and diverse points of view on religion and other matters of
philosophy. Therefore, to eliminate or reduce offense, if your
belief or philosophy allows you to do so, we ask that your
thought/reading/invocation comply with the following:
1. References which may recognize or be unique to a
particular religious belief should be avoided.
2. The thought/reading/invocation should not include an
attempt to convert or advance any particular faith, belief or
philosophy or disparage any other faith, belief or philosophy.
3. All such presentations will be made gratuitously and as
a part of the Opening Ceremony of each of the City Council's
regular Tuesday meetings, which will also includes a Pledge of
Allegiance to the Flag.
The City will not regulate or dictate the form or substance
of a presentation. Rather, these guidelines are to remind you of
the cultural diversity of the community and request that all
statements be sensitive to the feelings of others and promote
understanding, elevate motives and create a more civil
environment for conducting the public's business.
SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL*

*Per Council Resolution of 10/17/91.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
INC., a Maryland non-profit
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS;
and^J. WALKER,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

910906136

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake
City Council,
Defendants.

The parties have filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment
in the instant action.

Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this

Court that the City Council's practice of including, for a
number of stated secular purposes, a prayer as part of its
opening

ceremonies,

violates

Article

I,

Section

4

of

the

Constitution of the State of Utah.
This Court, on January 13, 1992, granted the Motion for
Leave to File Amicus Brief on behalf of the American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation of Utah, Inc.
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Oral

arguments

on
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the

respective
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motions

were

heard

February 21, 1991.

OPERATIVE FACTS
1.
and

The 1911 Utah State Legislature merged the legislative

executive

functions

of

commission form of government.

the

city

government

into

a

Prayer was not usually offered

during these meetings for the years 1911 through 1979.
2.

In 1980, pursuant to Title 10-3-1701, et seq., Utah

Code Ann., 1953, Salt Lake City
Mayor form of government.
separates

the

executive

adopted

the

Council-Strong

This form of government strictly
and

legislative

functions.

The

executive functions are carried out solely by the mayor, with
the legislative functions reserved to the City Council.
3.
Council

At its first meeting on January
decided

to open the meeting with

8, 1980, the City
a ceremony

included the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer.

which

From January

15, 198 0 until October 15, 1987, the proceedings of the City
Council reflect that a prayer or invocation was usually offered
at the beginning of each weekly legislative meeting.
4.

In a letter dated September 23, 1987, Assistant City

Attorney Ray Montgomery offered an opinion to the City Council

SEPARATIONISTS V, WHITEHEAD

that

pursuant

opening

to

Marsh

ceremonies

v.
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Chambers,

including

463

U.S. 783

prayerful

(1983) ,

invocations

were

constitutionally permissible.
5.

Beginning

on

May

17,

1988,

the

City

Council

reinstituted the practice of including prayers as part of the
opening ceremonies of the Council meetings.

Prayers were not

said before the Salt Lake City Council from October 15, 1987
through May 17, 1988.

Defendants acknowledge that the practice

of the City Council from 1980 to 1987 was to have prayers and
invocations.
6.

On

October

17,

1991, the

Salt

Lake

City

Council

adopted the Opening Ceremony Policy by a vote of 5 to 2.
7.

The formally adopted City Council Policy provides that

as part of an opening ceremony, the City Council will hear
various thoughts, readings and invocations prior to beginning
certain legislative sessions.

Contrary to the formally adopted

City Council Policy, at leasr two of the defendant City Council
members acknowledge that prayers and invocations before the
City Council have always been offered and will continue to be
offered for religious purposes.

Yet, the City Council Policy

specifies that the offering of these thoughts, readings and
invocations

is

for

a

number

of

secular

purposes.

These

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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specified secular purposes include the provision of a moment
during which the Council members and the audience can reflect
on

the

business

before

the

Council;

the

promotion

of

an

atmosphere of civility; the encouragement of lofty thought and
high-mindedness; the recognition of cultural diversity; and the
fostering of sensitivity for and recognition of the uniqueness
of all segments of our community.
8.

The

Council

non-denominational
presentations.

Policy

and

expresses

a

non-proselyting

Presentation

of

the

preference

opening

opening

the Policy, anyone not contacted
arrangements

to

give

their

by

the

opening

ceremony

ceremony

coordinated by the Salt Lake City Police Chaplain.

for

is

Pursuant to

Chaplain

can make

presentation.

The

presenters are not compensated in any way.
9.

Salt Lake City employee, Ed Snow, spent two days in

the fall of 1990 making telephone calls to sign up people that
would

offer

indicated

prayers

that

the

at
City

the
has

City
an

Council

extensive

meetings.
mailing

list

He
of

churches which was used to invite religious leaders to contact
the City to offer prayers.
10.
City

Defendant Council member Godfrey acknowledges that the

Council's

desire

and

goal

prayers has not been successful.

to

have

non-denominational

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD

11.
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Pace on October 17,

1991 stated with regard to the defendant's recently enacted
Policy regarding prayer before City Council meetings, "I don't
believe

that what we're

doing

[offering

prayers]

could

be

construed as secular and I don't believe that would hold up in
court."
12.

On September

10, 1991, the Salt Lake City Council

allowed the recitation of the following prayer by the Chaplain
of the Salt Lake City Police Department:
Our Father in Heaven, we are grateful this
night to be able to meet in this forum and
we ask Thee to bless those who participate,
that their minds will be clear and decisions
will be made that will be fair and equitable
to the citizens of the City.
We are
grateful
for
our
government.
We
are
grateful for the land we hold. Father, we
are grateful for the safe return of our
troops
from the Gulf.
We ask these
blessings in the name of Jesus Christ. Amen.
13.

Although requested orally and in writing to cease said

practice, the defendants have declined to do so.
14.

Defendants

admit

that

"existing

city

facilities,

assets and a small amount of time11 are used in conducting the
invocations.
results

in

The inclusion of prayers in City Council meetings
the

expenditure

of

public

funds,

assets

and

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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(meeting rooms, etc.)/

City equipment

stages,

resources

etc.),

City

programs,

etc.),

attending,

etc.),

and

City

are
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and

facilities

(microphones, podiums,

(electricity,

employees' time

used

City

expended

witnessing and/or reciting said prayers.

printing

of

(in

supervising,

in

programming,

Said funds, assets

and resources of Salt Lake City Corporation are utilized to aid
in the recitation of said prayers with the knowledge, approval,
concurrence and ratification of the defendants.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs

have

sought

Summary

Judgment

against

the

defendants seeking to enjoin the presentation of prayers and
invocations as part of the Salt Lake City Council meetings in
that the same constitutes an expenditure and appropriation by
defendants

of

funds

and

resources

in

violation

prohibitory provisions of Article I, Section
Constitution.

of

the

4 of the Utah

Specifically, it is argued the Utah Constitution

establishes the right of citizens to have no public money spent
on a religious exercise, the right to a government free of
sectarian

influence

their own religious

or control, and the
ideas

free of state

right to

entertain

intrusions.

These

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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guarantees of religious autonomy and absolute

separation of

church and state explicitly go beyond those protections offered
by the United States Constitution.

In expanding the rights of

its citizens, the Utah Constitution it is argued, distinctly
and

separately

rejects

the

practice

of

praying

before

legislative meetings.
Defendants have responded by arguing that notwithstanding
the differences in the language of the Utah Constitution to
that of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
this Court shoul'd decide the issue presented the way it has
been decided by the United States Supreme Court in the matter
of

Marsh

v.

traditional

Chambers,
prayers

463

are,

U.S.

783

under

(1983),

specified

in

that

such

circumstances,

acceptable under the First Amendment and do not constitute an
establishment of religion.

It is argued by the defendants that

the offering of non-denominational, non-proselyting prayers for
specified

secular

purposes

at

"legislative"

sessions

is

acceptable under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of
Utah.

Furthermore,

it

is

argued,

the

expenditures

are

de

minimus.
Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution in pertinent
part declares:

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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The rights of conscience shall never be
infringed.
The state shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof;. . .
There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State, or
interfere with its functions.
No public
money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied
to
any
religious
worship,
exercise or instruction, or for the support
of any ecclesiastical establishment. . . .
No

prior

Utah

Supreme

Court

cases

have

specifically

interpreted the foregoing constitutional provision insofar as
it relates to the exercise or the allowance of prayers and/or
invocations at city council or legislative meetings.

Moreover,

none of the cases cited by counsel are specifically on point.
However, while not of precedential value, it is instructive to
examine

decisions

from

other

state

courts

which

have

interpreted comparable provisions of their own constitutions.
Article I, Section 5, of the Oregon Constitution states:
No money shall be drawn from the treasury
for the benefit of any religeous [sic] or
theological institution, nor shall any money
be appropriated for the payment of any
religeous [sic] services in either house of
the Legislative assembly.

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD

This

provision

was
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by

the

Oregon

Court

of

Appeals in the matter of Kay v. Douglas School District, 719
P.2d

875

(Or.App. 1986)-

prohibition

The Oregon court

interpreted

of public expenditure on religious

strictly, finding

the

institutions

it applicable even though a teacher in a

public school had scheduled to read a prayer on volunteered
time.

The court held, as follows:
The fact that money spent on the preparation
and delivery of the invocation was not
apportioned and identified as a "line item"
in the budget does not take it out of the
proscription of Section 5, which prohibits
the spending of any money for the benefit
of any religious or theological institution.
Id. at 878. (Emphasis original)

In the matter of Sands v. Moronao Unified School District,
809

P.2d

809,

at

836

(Cal.

1991),

three

members

of

the

California Supreme Court determined that governmental support
and endorsement of graduation prayers violated both the state
and federal constitutions.
They refused to find the supposed "sectarian" nature of the
prayers

acceptable,

unconstitutional

"when

insisting

that

a

practice

is

it appears to place the government's

stamp of approval on a particular type of religious practice,

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD

such as public prayer."

PAGE 10

Id. at 816-

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Article XVI, Section 5,

of the California Constitution provides:
Neither the Legislature, nor any county,
city and county, township, school district,
or other municipal corporation, shall ever
make an appropriation, or pay from any
public fund whatever, or grant anything to
or in aid of any religious sect, church,
creed, or sectarian purpose. . . .
Judge Mosk, concurring, stated that,
and

should

be,

liberties....11

the
Id.

first: line
at

836.

of

Two

lf

[S]tate courts are

defense

additional

for

individual

judges

of

the

California Supreme Court having concurred in the finding that
the

practice

United

involved

violated

the

States Constitution, declined

First

Amendment

of

the

to reach the issue of

whether or not the practice involved violated the California
Constitution.

The remaining two judges determined there was no

violation.
Clearly, the pertinent provisions in the Utah Constitution
in question, have no counterparts in the federal constitution,
and are not intended to be restricted by interpretations of the
United States Constitution.

Instead, as asserted by the Utah

Supreme Court, the state constitution embodies certain of the
provisions of the federal constitution, and then expands and
expounds on these in greater detail:

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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[Pjrovision of Section 4, Article I, of the
Utah Constitution. . . is more articulate
and express in assuring religious liberty
and prohibiting discrimination, or church
interference with private or public rights,
than the generality of the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.
Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549, at
552 (Utah 1973) (Crockett, J., concurring).
One scholar has observed:
Compared
to the brief
and almost
enigmatic statement on religion in the
federal
constitution,
the
Utah
constitution's
provisions
seem
prolix
indeed. Almost every imaginable protection
for religious freedom and injunction against
the union of church and state has been
included.
[T]he union of church and state is
expressly prohibited. . . and appropriations
of public money
or property
to
"any
religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment" are proscribed.
Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State
Constitution, Utah L.Rev. 326, at 331 (1966) .
One of the principal, if not the first canon of statutory
or constitutional construction is that if the language of a
statute or constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous,
examination of legislative intent is unnecessary.

In Ramptgn

v. Barlow, 464 P. 2d 378 (Utah 1970), the Supreme Court held
that if the language of a statute or constitutional provision

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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intent

was

necessary.

"[Ijntent is to be found from the instrument itself;

and when

the text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the
courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to
search

for

its

meaning

beyond

the

instrument."

Hines

v.

Winters, 320 P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1957).
To get at the thought or meaning expressed
in a statute...or a Constitution, the first
resort, in all cases, is to the natural
signification of the words.... If the words
convey a definite meaning which involves no
absurdity, nor any contradiction of other
parts of the instrument, then that meaning,
apparent on the face of the instrument, must
be accepted and neither the courts nor the
Legislature have the right to add to it or
take from it.
Shaw v. Grumbie, 273 P. 311 (Okla. 1929)
Where there exists no ambiguity

in the language of the

document to be interpreted, and the interpretation therefore is
not doubtful, there

is little

reason

to

resort

to

factors

outside the words themselves for the meaning of the provision.
In this instance, the constitutional provision in question
is

unambiguous

and

capable

of

ready

interpretation.

The

unequivocal, unconditional pronouncements of Article I, Section
4 leave little room for clarification and interpretation.

SEPARATIONISTS V, WHITEHEAD
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is this Court's obligation to make every

reasonable

presumption in favor of constitutionality, and this Court will
not

nullify

legislative

expressly prohibited

enactments

unless

by the Constitution.

it

is

Utah

clear

and

Farm Bureau

Ins. Co. v, Utah Insurance Guaranty Assoc, 564 P.2d 751, 753
(Utah 1977) .

A legislative enactment is presumed to be valid

and in conformity with the constitution.
decision,

the

defendants'

adopted

For purposes of this

Policy

is

treated

"legislative" action, though there is some doubt.

as

It should

not be held to be invalid unless it has been shown beyond a
reasonable

doubt

to

be

constitutional provision.

incompatible

with

some

particular

Salt Lake Citv v. Savage, 541 P.2d

1035, 1037 (Utah 1975), cert, den., 425 U.S. 915 (1976).
The

language

of

the

Utah

Constitution

sets

forth

the

absolute law which Utah governmental officials are bound to
follow.
By encouraging, supporting, allowing or condoning religious
worship

before

non-secular

its

sessions,

entanglements.

By

the

Council

planning

for

is

enmeshed

and

in

presenting

public prayers as part of their opening ceremonies, the City
Council uses public
practice of prayer.

funds to aid and support the religious

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD
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Government prayer does involve the expenditure of public
funds.

The City Council has spent time and money to develop

guidelines for those offering invocations.

The Council members

and City employees are paid to observe and be solemnized by the
exercise-

City employees must schedule and arrange for the

attendance

of

the

person

offering

prayer.

Moreover,

the

facilities intended for use of the City are appropriated for
the actual presentation of prayer.

Such expenditures contrary

to the argument of defendants, are not de minimus, but on the
contrary,

represent

protected rights.

a

serious

threat

to

constitutionally

The Constitution of Utah dictates in clear

and bold terms that religious exercise must be separate from
the functions of government.
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
the Memoranda in support of the plaintiff's requested relief,
the

plaintiff's

Summary

Judgment

is

granted

as

prayed.

Defendant's cross Morion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Counsel for plaintiffs is to prepare the appropriate Orders.
Dated this

I S ^ a v of March, 1992.

JL DENNIS FREDERICK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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BRUCE R. BAIRD, #0176
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: "(801) 535-7788
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC.,
a Maryland non-profit corporation;
RICHARD ANDREWS; and J. WALKER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GODFREY, ROSELYN XIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake
City Council,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION
TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND MOTION
FOR CLARIFICATION OF
MEMORANDUM DECISION
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Civil No. 910905135 CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
In support of their objections to the plaintiffs' Proposed
Order Granting Summary Judgment and their further motion for
clarification of the Court's Memorandum Decision, the defendants
submit the following Memorandum.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MEMORANDUM DECISION AND PROPOSED ORDER
ARE AMBIGUOUS AND OVERBROAD IN THE USE OF THE
WORD "PRAYER".
The adopted City policy regarding Opening Ceremonies
provides for the presentation of "thoughts, readings and
invocations," along with the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag.

(See Exhibit "0" to the defendants' Original Memorandum in
Support of Summary Judgment.)

The policy also allows for the

Opening Ceremony to include patriotic songs such as America
Beautiful,

The National

Anthem and others.

the

The ceremony may also

include recitations from various American or Utah historical
documents, including the Declaration of Independence and the Utah
Constitution.
The Court's Memorandum Decision of March 2, 1992 contains no
definition of what would be prohibited as a "prayer". However,
by incorporating in its rationale the "[reasons] set forth in the
[plaintiffs'] Memoranda", the Court mav be adopting by reference
the Webster's Dictionary definition, which broadly defines prayer
to include any address to a god or any petition for divine
intervention.

(Court's Memorandum Decision, p. 14; Plaintiffs'

Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 15.)

However, the

only activity clearly prohibited by the Memorandum Decision would
be a repetition of the September 10, 1991 offering made by the
Salt Lake Police Chaplin.
Decision.)

(See paragraph 12 of the Memorandum

The plaintiffs' Proposed Order carries forward the

same definitional omission.
Rule S5A(d), U.R.C.P. requires that orders granting
injunctions "be specific in terms [and] describe in reasonable
detail, and not by reference to the Complaint or other document,
the act or acts sought to be restrained . . . ."

The Proposed

Order fails this test and the Memorandum Decision requires
clarification on the same point.
2

At a minimum, the Order must

define what is prohibited as a '•prayer". Without this
clarification the defendants are unable to determine whether
engaging in any of the following activities of the adopted poi
would constitute a "prayer" in violation of the Order:
A.

Pledge to Flac.

Pledging allegiance to a flag of ".

one nation under God,"
B.

Saying or reciting the following:
1.

National Anthem fHvmn).

Blessed with victory and oeacs,
mav the heav'n rescued land
praise the oow'r that hath made
and preserved us a nation!
Then conquer we must
when our cause it is just
and this be our motto:
'In God is Our Trust7
and the Star Spangled Banner
in triumph shall waive
over the land of the free
and the home of the brave!
2. America.
America! America!
God shed his crace on thee,
and crown thev good with brotherhood
from sea to shining sea.
3.

Utah State Song.

With wealth and peace in store,
to fame and glory soar,
God-guarded evermore,
Utah, we love thee.
4.

Preamble:

Utah Constitution.

Grateful to Almighty God for life and
liberty, we, the people of Utah in order to
secure and perpetuate the principles of free
government do ordain and establish this
CONSTITUTION."

3

5.

Declaration of Independence.

(a) We hold these truths to be self-evidence,
that all Men are created equal, that thev are
endowed bv their creator with certain
inalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of happiness
(b) When in the course of human Events, it
becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the
Political Bands which have connected then with
another, and to assume among the powers of the
Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the
Laws of nature and of nature's god entitle them, a
decent respect for the Opinions of mankind
requires that they should declare the causes which
impel them to the Separation.
(c) We, therefore, the Representatives of the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in GENERAL CONGRESS
Assembly appeal to the Supreme Judge of the World
for the rectitude of our Intentions, in the Name
and by the Authority of the Good People of these
Colonies, solemnly Publish and Declare That the
United Colonies of Right ought to be, FREE A-ND
INDEPENDENT STATES, . . .
(d) For the support of this Direction, with firm
Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence,
we mutually pledge each other our Lives, our
Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.
f Emphasis added.\

Each of these phrases are "prayer" under the

Webster definition, apparently adopted by reference in the
Court's Memorandum (.Id. at p. 14).
Further, the Memorandum Decision and Proposed Order require
clarification as to what other activities tangentially or
directly referring to a religious deity might violate the Court's
Order.
Chorus

For example, would the performance of Handel's
or 3eethoven's Ninth

Symphony

Hallelujah

or other Christmas Carols or

hymns in the City and County Building be a "prayer" in violation
of the Court's Order?

4

The Memorandum Decision and Proposed Order also appears to
impinge on the Council's statutory power to issue subpoenas and
take evidence as a legislative body.
Code Ann.)

(Section 10-3-510, Utah

Oaths under Utah law contain statements asking "God"

to assist the witness in telling the truth.

(See Sections 78-24-

17 and 18, U.C.A.: Rule 30(e) U.R.C.P. ; and, Rule 503, Utah Rules
of Evidence.)

Under the broad reach of the Memorandum Decision

and the Proposed Order these oaths may be construed as "prayers",
thus subjecting the Council to possible contempt sanctions.
Rule 65A, the maxims of equity, fundamental fairness and
elementary due process require that orders which may subject
persons

to contempt must be sufficiently clear to allow them to

know what conduct is proscribed and prohibited.

3y not defining

"prayer" the Memorandum Decision and Proposed Order fail this
test.

Further, the lack of a definition of prohibited "prayer"

inhibits the defendants from determining whether or not to appeal
the Court's decision and makes any eventual appellate review more
difficult.
POINT II
THE ORDER AND MEMORANDUM DECISION VIOLATE
COUNCIL MEMBERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Because the Court has interpreted this suit to be against
the Council Members, individually, the plaintiffs Proposed Order
violates the "Speech and Debate" privilege of the Council
Members.

As drafted, the Order would prohibit Council Members

during debate from uttering personal prayers, other references to
a deity or, if they were so inclined, from uttering profanities.
5

For the same reasons, the Proposed Order violates the
Council Members' individual First Amendment rights of Free Speech
and Freedom of Religion by prohibiting them from uttering their
own personal prayers during City Council meetings.

In order to

avoid contempt the City Council Members would also be required,
under the terms of the Proposed Order, to actively ensure that no
other person in the audience at City Council meetings recited
prayers.

As an example of the unclarity of the Proposed Order,

would the City Council's Sergeant at Arms be required to eject
from the meeting a citizen sitting in the back row of a Council
meeting quietly performing the Rosary or reciting the "Lord's
Prayer"?
The Proposed Order and Memorandum Decision also violate the
equal protection rights of Council Members. Merely by their
status as a Council Member they would be prohibited from engaging
in activities clearly within their individual First Amendment
rights of free speech and freedom of religion.

Such

discrimination involving the denial of the exercise of
fundamental constitutional rights cannot be justified.
The Proposed Order is overbroad and violates the Freedom of
Speech and Religion provisions of both the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Sections I and 4 of Article I of
the Utah Constitution.

The Order is not narrowly tailored to

serve an important governmental purpose and includes, within its
scope, protected free speech. As such, the Order would itself be
unconstitutional under tiie required strict scrutiny standard.
6

Content based restrictions, such as this Court's Memorandum
Decision and any Order eventually implementing the decision,
"will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling
governmental interest."
177 (1983).

United States v. Grace, 451 U.S. 171,

If a proposed restriction on speech is based on the

communicative impact of the speech, the regulation must be
examined by the courts with "the most exacting scrutiny."
v. Barrv, 485 U.S.

Boos

312, 321 (1988); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.

397 (1989).
CONCLUSION
The Proposed Order and Memorandum Decision are ambiguous,
overbroad, infringe upon Constitutional protections and fail to
comply with the standards for an injunction under Rule 55A(d) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the Court should
clarify its Memorandum Decision and any Order granting summary
judgment should reflect the following:
A.

The Decision and Order should apply only against the

officially adopted Council policy and prayers given as part of
the official Opening Ceremonies; it should not apply against
individual Council Members or third parties' speech outside the
parameters of that Opening Ceremony;
B.

The Order and Decision should define "prayer" with

sufficient specificity so that the Council members might not
accidentally violate the Order by giving or allowing an Opening
Ceremony event which might be characterized as "prayer";
C.

The Order and Decision should itemize and specify which
7

elements of the City Council policy (Exhibit "0") are prohibited
as "prayer" and which are allowed as protected speech; and
D.

The Decision and Order should expressly exclude the

giving of evidentiary oaths; the performance of holiday and/or
patriotic music; and the reading of historic documents, such as
the Preamble to the Utah Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence.
DATED this

If

day of March, 199^2.

s<i,„ ^

/

J: ^ - ^

ROGER ?< CUTLERS
City Attorney
Attorney for Defendants

BRUCE R. 3AIRD
Assistant City Attorney
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH
SCCrSTY OF SSPARATIONISTS, INC.,
a Maryland non-orofit corporation;
RZC'd^RD ANDREWS; and J. WALKER,
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HCRRCCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GODFREY, RCSSLYN KIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake
City Council,

Civil No. 910905135 CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

MOTION AND OBJECTION
Pursuant to Rule 4-504(3) of the Code of Judicial
Administration die defendants hereby object to the

Proposed Order

Granting Summary Judgment mailed by plaintiffs' counsel on March
o, 1992.l
?*?-*
cia.

Further, the defendants move the Court for a

.cation of its Memorandum Decision of March 2, 1992.

L

The plaintiffs' counsel inadvertently omitted page 3 from
the Proposed Order when ~z was originally sent to tne defendants
The complete ?roposad Order was received by the iefandants on
Marcn id, 1992. (A copy of tne Proposed Order is attached as
Sxriibit "A". }

II.
GROUNDS
The Objection and Motion are made on the following grounds:
1.

The Proposed Order and the Memorandum Decision do not

comply with Rule o5A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or Due
Process in that they do not provide the defendants with
sufficient guidance so that they will not accidentiy violate the
Court's Order;
2.

Neither the Memorandum Decision nor the Proposed Order

defines the prohibited activity of "prayer" so that the Council
can reasonably be advised of what acts are enjoined;
3.

The Proposed Order improperly restricts the activities

of individual Council Members and prohibits or chills speech
protected under both the Utah and Federal Constitutions;
4.

The Proposed Order violates the Council Members' "Speech

and Debate" immunity and their rights of equal protection; and
5.

The proposed Order may restrict the legislative

investigatoriai powers of the Council to investigate and receive
evidence, under oath.
III.
SUPPORT
Grounds in support of this Objection and Motion are mora
fully specified in the accompanying Memorandum.
IV.
R5LIS? SOUGHT
vvHEREFORS, defendants pray that the Cour4: should clarify its
2

Memorandum Decision and any Order granting summary judgment; they
should reflect the following:
A.

The Decision and Order should apply only against

official Council policy and actions, and not against individual
Council Members or third parties' speech;
B.

The Order and Decision should define "prayer" with

sufficient specificity so that the Council Members might not
accidentally violate the Order;
C.

The Order and Decision should itemize and specify which

elements of the City Council policy (Exhibit "0") are prohibited
as "prayer"; and
D.

The Decision and Order should expressly exclude the

giving of evidentiary oaths; the performance of holiday and/or
patriotic music; and the reading of historic documents, such as
the Preamble to the Utah Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence.
DATED this

//

day of March, 19-9-2-.—';

ROGER 5\ CUTL2R
City Attorney

3R3CZ R. 3AIRD
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants
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EXHIBIT ^.
SSCf/y-

UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
BRIAN" M. 3ARNARD
C7S3 «* 0215
JOHN" PACE
US3 ,# 5524.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt LaJ<a City, UTAH
3 4111-3 204
Phone: (301) *323-9531 or 323-9532
IN IHZ THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNT?

SOCIETY OF
SEPARATIONISTS, INC.,
a Maryland non-profit:
c o r o o r a - i o n ; RZCyjJLD ANDREWS;
and J . WALKER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE Or UTAH

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 91-090-5135 CV

RON- WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GO0FREY, RCSZLYN KIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt: LaJ<a
City Council
Defendants.

(Hon. J.O. FREDERICK)

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER Slaving coma befora "ha Court
for hearing on February 21, 1992 on the parries' mutual
motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs being represented by
3rian M. 3amard and defendants being represented by Roger
Cutler, "ha Court having reviewed the file and all of -ha
pLeadings "herein, "ha matter having 'z&^n argued and
submitted and the oourt now being fully advised in the

premises, based upon the facts and reasoning set ou: in
plaintiffs' memoranda and in the Court's Memorandum Decision
of March 2, 1992, there being no substantial material facts
in dispute,
IT IS ZZRZ3V ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
defendants' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby
is denied; further,
IT 15 KER£3y ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby
is granted; further,
IT 13 HERZ3y ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
plaintiffs are entitled to and are hereby granted a
declaratory judgment to tine effect that the past expenditures
of funds by defendants and the use of City resources in
support of prayers at City Council meetings and the practice
of defendants and Salt LaJca City in having or allowing
prayers to be recited at meetings of the Salt LaJce City
Council violate Art- I, 5 4 of the Utah. Constitution;
further,
IT 13 HZRE3Y ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
defendants, their agents and employees are hereby permanently
proaibited and enjoined from allowing or having prayers
recited at meetings of the Salt Hajca City Council and they
2

are permanently enjoined and prohibited from appending public
funds, resources or property to support or ar.couraga such
prayars; further,
IT IS HZRI3? ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DSCHEZD that the
plaintiffs ara awarded a judgment against defendants for
plaintiffs' court costs incurred in this matter in the sum of
one hundred three dollars (3103.00).
DATED this

day of yj-3.CZ, 1992.
3? THE COURT:

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
JUDGE

3
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RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake
City Council,

Civil No. 910906136 CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

CITY LEGISLATORS DO NOT HAVE THEIR RIGHTS OF
FREE EXPRESSION COMPROMISED BY VIRTUE OF
THEIR ELECTED STATUS OR ACTING AS CITY
COUNCIL MEMBERS.
On March 17, 1992, the unpleasant fall-out from the Court's
Memorandum Decision was in full display.

Brent Richards, an

elected Councilman of Riverton City, appeared before Salt Lake
City's legislative body to protest the Court's Memorandum
Decision, state his view on freedom of speech rights of Council
Members and urge an appeal of the Court's Decision.

As part of

that presentation, he undertook a protest statement by beginning

a prayer.

He was abruptly interrupted by the Chair of the Salt

Lake City Council and, when he protested, was forcibly ejected
from the Council Chambers by the Police Sergeant-at-arms. (See
Affidavit of Deputy City Recorder, Chris Meeker.)
• Council Chair Hardman's response was, admittedly, premature
in that the Order, implementing the Court's Decision, had not
been executed.

However, it serves as a pointed illustration of

the ugly consequences of the Order, as proposed by Plaintiffs'.
In legal sophistry that escapes the common-man, with his innate
sense of justice, and escapes the reason of even those learned in
the law, we appear to have reached the absurdity that one can
appear on public property and burn the American flag, with
protected constitutional speech, but be gagged for rendering a
prayful protest utterance.
Plaintiffs' reply asserts that such a consequence is
mandated by reverence for this newly discovered "fundamental"
constitutional right, which has lain dormant and undiscovered for
almost a hundred years.

Plaintiffs' counsel, further, makes the

startling justification that his proposed broad order that
enjoins the free speech rights of individual Council members and
prevents them from even "encouraging" prayer on public property
(applicable to their private "employees") is a sacrifice stemming
from their election.

(See Plaintiffs' Reply Memo dated March 18,

1992 at pg. 8.)
No authority is cited for this extraordinary declaration
and, indeed, no authority citation could be made.
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The writer is

aware of only one Utah rationale, which would support such a
position.

That is the much maligned position of Justice Ellott,

declaring that Utah need not follow the U.S. Supreme Court
dictates on the Fourth Amendment because the Fourteenth had not
been validly executed.

The Justice's infamous argument that we

need no "Mapp" to guide us and that the Fourteenth Amendment
should be invalid against states has brought much ridicule to the
state and the state's judiciary.

[See, generally, State v.

Richards, 489 P.2d 422 (Utah 1971), Dvett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266
(Utah 1968)].
The supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution is alive and
well in Utah.

Further, for the reasons under the authorities

previously cited in the Plaintiffs' memorandum, the First
Amendment and the State's free speech provisions require strict
scrutiny, narrowly tailored orders and regulations, when the
content of speech is to be prescribed.

Regardless of the scope

of Plaintiffs' now asserted intent, that intent does not reflect
itself in the proposed Order. Without repeating the previous
observations about vagueness, overbreadth and ambiguity, the
chilling impact of is illustrated by the expulsion of Council
Member Richards.
One must question how the Plaintiffs and the amicus Civil
Liberties Union will react when their political opponents and
those having different ideology seek to have government attorneys
use such an oppressive order as a sword.

One can readily

envision such a request being made on Civil Rights Day, and day's
,3

of criminal executions, when it is traditional to have a "prayer
vigil", with the burning of candles and prayers, for those
respective causes.
After nearly twenty five years of public sector practice,
the writer can affirmatively declare that an Ordinance drafted
with the overbreadth and vagueness and chilling prior restraint
that is finally evident in the Plaintiffs' Proposed Order would
bring Civil Rights challenges like seagulls to the city dump.
And rightfully so.

Having been drawn into this thicket, it is

respectfully submitted that the Court should decline to step
deeper into the swampy quicksand by enjoining the expressive
rights of these individual Council members.
Plaintiffs and their counsel, should not be left to guess or
speculate as to the Court's meaning of "prayer" or what is
prohibited.

Governments should not have to defend a second tier

of suit seeking to prohibit prayer vigils, and other forms of
expression.
If the Court is committed to break ranks with the Tenth
Circuit in Anderson and the Utah Supreme Court in Thomas, by
reading Article I §4 to be something different than an
establishment provision, it ought to do so with an judicial
scalpel and not the meat axe handed it by Plaintiffs.
II.
DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT "0" IS A WRITTEN
STATEMENT OF COUNCIL POLICY AND NOT A POST
HOC ADOPTION, FOLLOWING THE LAWSUIT.
Plaintiffs have suggested a Council action which was adopted
4

following the lawsuit.

Statement is materially misleading.

The

following chronology is of record:
1.

Plaintiffs7 counsel addressed a letter to the Mayor

demanding that the City Council discontinue its invocation
policy, September 12, 1991.
2.

The matter was duly referred to the Council by the

Mayor, as a separate and equal branch of government.

The Council

debated and prepared a written discussion draft of this preexisting and policy; a copy of which was forwarded to Plaintiffs'
counsel, Mr. Barnard, on September 25, 1991. The Council meeting
for consideration was identified as October 4, 1991.
3.

Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit September 26, 1991, at

approximately 3:51 p.m., apparently in response to the Council
draft.
4.

None of the Plaintiffs or Mr. Barnard appeared before

the Council, submitted any response or made any objections to the
City Council concerning the proposed written policy.

The City

Council vigorously debated the proposed policy and adopted it on
a 5 to 2 vote on October 17, 1991.
The City Council policy reflected, in writing, preexisting
practice and rationale.

The Plaintiffs' assertion and suggestion

of a post filing creation is not supported by the record.

In

point of fact, it was Plaintiffs who apparently rushed to the
court house in an attempt to beat the deliberative democratic
process, in the Councils' reevaluation of its policy and
formalizing it in written form.
•5

DATED this ^ T ^ d a y of

r T \ g ^ c^v

, 1992

KROGER F. CUTLER
City Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to
the below listed by depositing the same in. the U.S. mail, postage
prepaid thereon, this ^ T ^ d a y of r^'V.ycft
Brian M. Barnard
John Pace
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
Kathryn D. Kendell
Attorney for ACLU
Boston Building #419
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

SOCIETY OF
SEPARATIONISTS, INC.,
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS;
and J. WALKER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE OF UTAH

^-12.-9 a-sen cJw,
ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 91-090-6136 CV

RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake
City Council
Defendants.

(Hon. J.D. FREDERICK)

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court
for hearing on February 21, 1992 on the parties' mutual
motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs being represented by
Brian M. Barnard and defendants being represented by Roger
Cutler, the Court having reviewed the file and all of the
pleadings therein, the matter having been argued and
submitted and the court now being fully advised in the

premises, based upon the facts and reasoning set out in
plaintiffs' memoranda and in the Court's Memorandum Decision
of March 2, 1992, there being no substantial material facts
in dispute,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
defendants' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby
is denied; further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be and hereby
is granted; further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
plaintiffs are entitled to and are hereby granted a
declaratory judgment to the effect that the past expenditures
of funds by defendants and the use of City resources in
support of prayers at City Council meetings and the practice
of defendants and Salt Lake City in having or allowing
prayers to be recited at meetings of the Salt Lake City
Council violate Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution;
further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
defendants, their agents and employees are hereby permanently
prohibited and enjoined from allowing or having prayers
recited at meetings of the Salt Lake City Council and they
2

are permanently enjoined and prohibited from expending public
funds, resources or property to support or encourage such
prayers; further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
plaintiffs are awarded a judgment against defendants for
plaintiffs' court costs incurred in this matter in the sum of
one hundred three dollars ($103.00).
DATED this

^ ^ d a y of 4Mffi§H, 1992.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
to:
ROGER CUTLER & BRUCE BAIRD
Attorneys for Defendants
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEYS
SALT LAKE CITY & COUNTY BUILDING
WASHINGTON SQUARE
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
KATHRYN KENDELL
STAFF COUNSEL
ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS
THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOUNDATION OF UTAH, INC.
BOSTON BUILDING
#419
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
on the 6TH day of MARCH, 1992, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the
people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles
of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty - No property qualification to
vote or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The
State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall
be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or
for any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or
for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, or hold
office, except as provided in this Constitution.
ARTICLE III
ORDINANCE
[Religious toleration - Polygamy forbidden.]
First: - Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is
guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested
in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious
worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever
prohibited.

